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We prove that interactive learning based classical realizability (introduced by Aschieri and Berardi for
first order arithmetic [1]) is sound with respect to Coquand game semantics. In particular, any realizer
of an implication-and-negation-free arithmetical formula embodies a winning recursive strategy for
the 1-Backtracking version of Tarski games. We also give examples of realizer and winning strategy
extraction for some classical proofs. We also sketch some ongoing work about how to extend our
notion of realizability in order to obtain completeness with respect to Coquand semantics, when it is
restricted to 1-Backtracking games.
1 Introduction
In this paper we show that learning based realizability (see Aschieri and Berardi [1]) relates to 1-
Backtracking Tarski games as intuitionistic realizability (see Kleene [8]) relates to Tarski games. It
is well know that Tarski games (see, definition 12 below) are just a simple way of rephrasing the concept
of classical truth in terms of a game between two players - the first one trying to show the truth of a
formula, the second its falsehood - and that an intuitionistic realizer gives a winning recursive strategy to
the first player. The result is quite expected: since a realizer gives a way of computing all the information
about the truth of a formula, the player trying to prove the truth of that formula has a recursive winning
strategy. However, not at all any classically provable arithmetical formula allows a winning recursive
strategy for that player; otherwise, the decidability of the Halting problem would follow. In [5], Co-
quand introduced a game semantics for Peano Arithmetic such that, for any provable formula A, the first
player has a recursive winning strategy, coming from the proof of A. The key idea of that remarkable
result is to modify Tarski games, allowing players to correct their mistakes and backtrack to a previ-
ous position. Here we show that learning based realizers have direct interpretation as winning recursive
strategies in 1-Backtracking Tarski games (which are a particular case of Coquand games see [4] and
definition 11 below). The result, again, is expected: interactive learning based realizers, by design, are
similar to strategies in games with backtracking: they improve their computational ability by learning
from interaction and counterexamples in a convergent way; eventually, they gather enough information
about the truth of a formula to win the game.
An interesting step towards our result was the Hayashi realizability [7]. Indeed, a realizer in the sense
of Hayashi represents a recursive winning strategy in 1-Backtracking games. However, from the com-
putational point of view, realizers do not relate to 1-Backtracking games in a significant way: Hayashi
winning strategies work by exhaustive search and, actually, do not learn from the game and from the
interaction with the other player. As a result of this issue, constructive upper bounds on the length of
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games cannot be obtained, whereas using our realizability it is possible. For example, in the case of the
1-Backtracking Tarski game for the formula ∃x∀y f (x) ≤ f (y), the Hayashi realizer checks all the natu-
ral numbers until an n such that ∀y f (n) ≤ f (y) is found; on the contrary, our realizer yields a strategy
which bounds the number of backtrackings by f (0), as shown in this paper. In this case, the Hayashi
strategy is the same one suggested by the classical truth of the formula, but instead one is interested in
the constructive strategy suggested by its classical proof.
Since learning based realizers are extracted from proofs in HA+ EM1 (Heyting Arithmetic with ex-
cluded middle over existential sentences, see [1]), one also has an interpretation of classical proofs as
learning strategies. Moreover, studying learning based realizers in terms of 1-Backtracking games also
sheds light on their behaviour and offers an interesting case study in program extraction and interpreta-
tion in classical arithmetic.
The plan of the paper is the following. In section §2, we recall the calculus of realizers and the
main notion of interactive learning based realizability. In section §3, we prove our main theorem: a
realizer of an arithmetical formula embodies a winning strategy in its associated 1-Backtracking Tarski
game. In section §4, we extract realizers from two classical proofs and study their behavior as learning
strategies. In section §5, we define an extension of our realizability and formulate a conjecture about its
completeness with respect to 1-Backtracking Tarski games.
2 The Calculus TClass and Learning-Based Realizability
The whole content of this section is based on Aschieri and Berardi [1], where the reader may also find
full motivations and proofs. We recall here the definitions and the results we need in the rest of the paper.
The winning strategies for 1-Backtracking Tarski games will be represented by terms of TClass (see [1]).
TClass is a system of typed lambda calculus which extends Go¨del’s system T by adding symbols for non
computable functions and a new type S (denoting a set of states of knowledge) together with two basic
operations over it. The terms of TClass are computed with respect to a state of knowledge, which represents
a finite approximation of the non computable functions used in the system.
For a complete definition of T we refer to Girard [6]. T is simply typed λ -calculus, with atomic
types N (representing the set N of natural numbers) and Bool (representing the set B = {True,False} of
booleans), product types T ×U and arrows types T →U , constants 0 : N, S : N→ N, True,False : Bool,
pairs 〈., .〉, projections pi0,pi1, conditional ifT and primitive recursion RT in all types, and the usual
reduction rules (β ),(pi),(if),(R) for λ , 〈., .〉,ifT ,RT . From now on, if t,u are terms of T with t = u we
denote provable equality in T. If k ∈ N, the numeral denoting k is the closed normal term Sk(0) of type
N. All closed normal terms of type N are numerals. Any closed normal term of type Bool in T is True
or False.
We introduce a notation for ternary projections: if T = A× (B×C), with p0, p1, p2 we respectively
denote the terms pi0, λx : T.pi0(pi1(x)), λx : T.pi1(pi1(x)). If u = 〈u0,〈u1,u2〉〉 : T , then piu = ui in T for
i = 0,1,2. We abbreviate 〈u0,〈u1,u2〉〉 : T with 〈u0,u1,u2〉 : T .
Definition 1 (States of Knowledge and Consistent Union) 1. A k-ary predicate of T is any closed
normal term P : Nk → Bool of T.
2. An atom is any triple 〈P,~n,m〉, where P is a (k + 1)-ary predicate of T, and ~n,m are (k + 1)
numerals, and P~nm = True in T.
3. Two atoms 〈P,~n,m〉, 〈P′,~n′,m′〉 are consistent if P = P′ and~n = ~n′ in T imply m = m′.
4. A state of knowledge, shortly a state, is any finite set S of pairwise consistent atoms.
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5. Two states S1,S2 are consistent if S1∪S2 is a state.
6. S is the set of all states of knowledge.
7. The consistent union S1U S2 of S1,S2 ∈ S is S1∪S2 ∈ S minus all atoms of S2 which are inconsistent
with some atom of S1.
For each state of knowledge S we assume having a unique constant S denoting it; if there is no ambiguity,
we just assume that state constants are strings of the form {〈P, ~n1,m1〉, . . . ,〈P, ~nk,mk〉}, denoting a state of
knowledge. We define with TS = T+S+{S|S ∈ S} the extension of T with one atomic type S denoting
S, and a constant S : S for each S ∈ S, and no new reduction rule. Computation on states will be defined
by a set of algebraic reduction rules we call “functional”.
Definition 2 (Functional set of rules) Let C be any set of constants, each one of some type A1 → . . .→
An → A, for some A1, . . . ,An,A ∈ {Bool,N,S}. We say that R is a functional set of reduction rules for
C if R consists, for all c ∈C and all closed normal terms a1 : A1, . . . ,an : An of TS, of exactly one rule
ca1 . . .an 7→ a, where a : A is a closed normal term of TS.
We define two extensions of TS: an extension TClass with symbols denoting non-computable maps XP :
Nk → Bool,ΦP : Nk → N (for each k-ary predicate P of T) and no computable reduction rules, another
extension TLearn, with the computable approximations χP,φP of XP,ΦP, and a computable set of reduction
rules. XP and ΦP are intended to represent respectively the oracle mapping~n to the truth value of ∃xP~nx,
and a Skolem function mapping ~n to an element m such that ∃xP~nx holds iff P~nm = True. We use
the elements of TClass to represent non-computable realizers, and the elements of TLearn to represent a
computable “approximation” of a realizer. We denote terms of type S by ρ ,ρ ′, . . ..
Definition 3 Assume P : Nk+1 → Bool is a k+ 1-ary predicate of T. We introduce the following con-
stants:
1. χP : S→ Nk → Bool and ϕP : S→ Nk → N.
2. XP : Nk → Bool and ΦP : Nk → N.
3. ⋒ : S→ S→ S (we denote ⋒ρ1ρ2 with ρ1⋒ρ2).
4. AddP : Nk+1 → S and addP : S→ Nk+1 → S.
1. ΞS is the set of all constants χP,ϕP,⋒,addP.
2. Ξ is the set of all constants XP,ΦP,⋒,AddP.
3. TClass = TS+Ξ.
4. A term t ∈ TClass has state /0 if it has no state constant different from /0.
Let~t = t1 . . . tk. We interpret χPs~t and ϕPs~t respectively as a “guess” for the values of the oracle and the
Skolem map XP and ΦP for ∃y.P~ty, guess computed w.r.t. the knowledge state denoted by the constant
s. There is no set of computable reduction rules for the constants ΦP,XP ∈ Ξ, and therefore no set
of computable reduction rules for TClass. If ρ1,ρ2 denotes the states S1,S2 ∈ S, we interpret ρ1 ⋒ ρ2 as
denoting the consistent union S1U S2 of S1,S2. AddP denotes the map constantly equal to the empty state
/0. addPS~nm denotes the empty state /0 if we cannot add the atom 〈P,~n,m〉 to S, either because 〈P,~n,m′〉 ∈ S
for some numeral m′, or because P~nm = False. addPS~nm denotes the state {〈P,~n,m〉} otherwise. We
define a system TLearn with reduction rules over ΞS by a functional reduction set RS.
Definition 4 (The System TLearn) Let s,s1,s2 be state constants denoting the states S,S1,S2. Let 〈P,~n,m〉
be an atom. RS is the following functional set of reduction rules for ΞS:
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1. If 〈P,~n,m〉 ∈ S, then χPs~n 7→ True and ϕPs~n 7→ m, else χPs~n 7→ False and ϕPs~n 7→ 0.
2. s1⋒ s2 7→ S1U S2
3. addPs~nm 7→ /0 if either 〈P,~n,m′〉 ∈ S for some numeral m′ or P~nm = False, and addPs~nm 7→
{〈P,~n,m〉} otherwise.
We define TLearn = TS+ΞS+RS.
Remark. TLearn is nothing but TS with some “syntactic sugar”. TLearn is strongly normalizing, has Church-
Rosser property for closed term of atomic types and:
Proposition 1 (Normal Form Property for TLearn) Assume A is either an atomic type or a product type.
Then any closed normal term t ∈ TLearn of type A is: a numeral n : N, or a boolean True,False : Bool,
or a state constant s : S, or a pair 〈u,v〉 : B×C.
Definition 5 Assume t ∈ TClass and s is a state constant. We call “approximation of t at state s” the term
t[s] of TLearn obtained from t by replacing each constant XP with χPs, each constant ΦP with ϕPs, each
constant AddP with addPs.
If s,s′ are state constants denoting S,S′ ∈ S, we write s≤ s′ for S⊆ S′. We say that a sequence {si}i∈N
of state constants is a weakly increasing chain of states (is w.i. for short), if si ≤ si+1 for all i ∈ N.
Definition 6 (Convergence) Assume that {si}i∈N is a w.i. sequence of state constants, and u,v ∈ TClass.
1. u converges in {si}i∈N if ∃i ∈ N.∀ j ≥ i.u[s j] = u[si] in TLearn.
2. u converges if u converges in every w.i. sequence of state constants.
Our realizability semantics relies on two properties of the non computable terms of atomic type in TClass.
First, if we repeatedly increase the knowledge state s, eventually the value of t[s] stops changing. Second,
if t has type S, and contains no state constants but /0, then we may effectively find a way of increasing the
knowledge state s such that eventually we have t[s] = /0.
Theorem 1 (Stability Theorem) Assume t ∈ TClass is a closed term of atomic type A (A ∈ {Bool,N,S}).
Then t is convergent.
Theorem 2 (Fixed Point Property) Let t : S be a closed term of TClass of state /0, and s = S. Define
τ(S) = S′ if t[S] = S′, and f (S) = S∪ τ(S).
1. For any n ∈ N, define f 0(S) = S and f n+1(S) = f ( f n(S)). There are h ∈ N, S′ ∈ S such that
S′ = f h(S)⊇ S, f (S′) = S′ and τ(S′) = /0.
2. We may effectively find a state constant s′ ≥ s such that t[s′] = /0.
Definition 7 (The language L of Peano Arithmetic) 1. The terms of L are all t ∈ T, such that
t : N and FV (t)⊆ {xN1 , . . . ,xNn} for some x1, . . . ,xn.
2. The atomic formulas of L are all Qt1 . . . tn ∈ T, for some Q : Nn → Bool closed term of T, and
some terms t1, . . . , tn of L .
3. The formulas of L are built from atomic formulas of L by the connectives ∨,∧,→∀,∃ as usual.
Definition 8 (Types for realizers) For each arithmetical formula A we define a type |A| of T by induc-
tion on A: |P(t1, . . . , tn)| = S, |A∧B| = |A| × |B|, |A∨B| = Bool× (|A| × |B|), |A → B| = |A| → |B|,
|∀xA|= N→ |A|, |∃xA|= N×|A|
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We define now our notion of realizability, which is relativized to a knowledge state s, and differs from
Kreisel modified realizability for a single detail: if we realize an atomic formula, the atomic formula
does not need to be true, unless the realizer is equal to the empty set in s.
Definition 9 (Realizability) Assume s is a state constant, t ∈ TClass is a closed term of state /0, A ∈L is
a closed formula, and t : |A|. Let~t = t1, . . . , tn : N.
1. t s P(~t) if and only if t[s] = /0 in TLearn implies P(~t) = True
2. t s A∧B if and only if pi0t s A and pi1t s B
3. t s A∨B if and only if either p0t[s] = True in TLearn and p1t s A, or p0t[s] = False in TLearn and
p2t s B
4. t s A → B if and only if for all u, if us A, then tus B
5. t s ∀xA if and only if for all numerals n, tns A[n/x]
6. t s ∃xA if and only for some numeral n, pi0t[s] = n in TLearn and pi1t s A[n/x]
We define t  A if and only if t s A for all state constants s.
Theorem 3 If A is a closed formula provable in HA+EM1 (see [1]), then there exists t ∈ TClass such that
t  A.
3 Games, Learning and Realizability
In this section, we define the notion of game, its 1-Backtracking version andTarski games. We also prove
our main theorem, connecting learning based realizability and 1-Backtracking Tarski games.
Definition 10 (Games) 1. A game G between two players is a quadruple (V,E1,E2,W ), where V is a
set, E1,E2 are subsets of V ×V such that Dom(E1)∩Dom(E2) = /0, where Dom(Ei) is the domain
of Ei, and W is a set of sequences, possibly infinite, of elements of V . The elements of V are called
positions of the game; E1, E2 are the transition relations respectively for player one and player
two: (v1,v2) ∈ Ei means that player i can legally move from the position v1 to the position v2.
2. We define a play to be a walk, possibly infinite, in the graph (V,E1∪E2), i.e. a sequence, possibly
void, v1 :: v2 :: . . . :: vn :: . . . of elements of V such that (vi,vi+1) ∈ E1∪E2 for every i. A play of
the form v1 :: v2 :: . . . :: vn :: . . . is said to start from v1. A play is said to be complete if it is either
infinite or is equal to v1 :: . . . :: vn and vn /∈ Dom(E1∪E2). W is required to be a set of complete
plays. If p is a complete play and p ∈W, we say that player one wins in p. If p is a complete play
and p /∈W, we say that player two wins in p.
3. Let PG be the set of finite plays. Consider a function f : PG → V ; a play v1 :: . . . :: vn :: . . . is said
to be f -correct if f (v1, . . . ,vi) = vi+1 for every i such that (vi,vi+1) ∈ E1
4. A winning strategy from position v for player one is a function ω : PG →V such that every complete
ω-correct play v :: v1 :: . . . :: vn :: . . . belongs to W.
Notation. If for i ∈ N, i = 1, . . . ,n we have that pi = (pi)0 :: . . . :: (pi)ni is a finite sequence of elements
of length ni, with p1 :: . . . :: pn we denote the sequence
(p1)0 :: . . . :: (p1)n1 :: . . . :: (pk)0 :: . . . :: (pk)nk
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where (pi) j denotes the j-th element of the sequence pi.
Suppose that a1 :: a2 :: . . . :: an is a play of a game G, representing, for some reason, a bad situation
for player one (for example, in the game of chess, an might be a configuration of the chessboard in which
player one has just lost his queen). Then, learnt the lesson, player one might wish to erase some of his
moves and come back to the time the play was just, say, a1,a2 and choose, say, b1 in place of a3; in other
words, player one might wish to backtrack. Then, the game might go on as a1 :: a2 :: b1 :: . . . :: bm and,
once again, player one might want to backtrack to, say, a1 :: a2 :: b1 :: . . . :: bi, with i < m, and so on...
As there is no learning without remembering, player one must keep in mind the errors made during the
play. This is the idea of 1-Backtracking games (for more motivations, we refer the reader to [4] and [3])
and here is our definition.
Definition 11 (1-Backtracking Games) Let G = (V,E1,E2,W ) be a game.
1. We define 1Back(G) as the game (PG,E ′1,E ′2,W ′), where:
2. PG is the set of finite plays of G
3. E ′2 := {(p :: a, p :: a :: b) | p, p :: a ∈ PG,(a,b) ∈ E2} and
E ′1 := {(p :: a, p :: a :: b) | p, p :: a ∈ PG,(a,b) ∈ E1} ∪
{(p :: a :: q :: d, p :: a) | p,q ∈ PG, p :: a :: q :: d ∈ PG,a ∈ Dom(E1)
d /∈ Dom(E2), p :: a :: q :: d /∈W};
4. W ′ is the set of finite complete plays p1 :: . . . :: pn of (PG,E ′1,E ′2) such that pn ∈W .
Note. The pair (p :: a :: q :: d, p :: a) in the definition above of E ′2 codifies a backtracking move by player
one (and we point out that q :: d might be the empty sequence).
Remark. Differently from [4], in which both players are allowed to backtrack, we only consider the case
in which only player one is supposed do that (as in [7]). It is not that our results would not hold: clearly,
the proofs in this paper would work just as fine for the definition of 1-Backtracking Tarski games given
in [4]. However, as noted in [4], any player-one recursive winning strategy in our version of the game can
be effectively transformed into a winning strategy for player one in the other version the game. Hence,
adding backtracking for the second player does not increase the computational challenge for player one.
Moreover, the notion of winner of the game given in [4] is strictly non constructive and games played by
player one with the correct winning strategy may even not terminate. Whereas, with our definition, we
can formulate our main theorem as a program termination result: whatever the strategy chosen by player
two, the game terminates with the win of player one. This is also the spirit of realizability and hence of
this paper: the constructive information must be computed in a finite amount of time, not in the limit.
In the well known Tarski games, there are two players and a formula on the board. The second player
- usually called Abelard - tries to show that the formula is false, while the first player - usually called
Eloise - tries to show that it is true. Let us see the definition.
Definition 12 (Tarski Games) Let A be a closed implication and negation free arithmetical formula of
L . We define the Tarski game for A as the game TA = (V,E1,E2,W ), where:
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1. V is the set of all subformula occurrences of A; that is, V is the smallest set of formulas such that,
if either A∨B or A∧B belongs to V , then A,B ∈V ; if either ∀xA(x) or ∃xA(x) belongs to V , then
A(n) ∈V for all numerals n.
2. E1 is the set of pairs (A1,A2) ∈ V ×V such that A1 = ∃xA(x) and A2 = A(n), or A1 = A∨B and
either A2 = A or A2 = B;
3. E2 is the set of pairs (A1,A2) ∈ V ×V such that A1 = ∀xA(x) and A2 = A(n), or A1 = A∧B and
A2 = A or A2 = B;
4. W is the set of finite complete plays A1 :: . . . :: An such that An = True.
Note. We stress that Tarski games are defined only for implication and negation free formulas. Indeed,
1Back(TA), when A contains implications, would be much more involved and less intuitive (for a defini-
tion of Tarski games for every arithmetical formula see for example Berardi [2]).
What we want to show is that if tA, t gives to player one a recursive winning strategy in 1Back(TA).
The idea of the proof is the following. Suppose we play as player one. Our strategy is relativized to a
knowledge state and we start the game by fixing the actual state of knowledge as /0. Then we play in the
same way as we would do in the Tarski game. For example, if there is ∀xA(x) on the board and A(n)
is chosen by player two, we recursively play the strategy given by tn; if there is ∃xA(x) on the board,
we calculate pi0t[ /0] = n and play A(n) and recursively the strategy given by pi1t. If there is A∨B on the
board, we calculate p0t[ /0], and according as to whether it equals True or False, we play the strategy
recursively given by p1t or p2t. If there is an atomic formula on the board, if it is true, we win; otherwise
we extend the current state with the state /0⋒ t[ /0], we backtrack and play with respect to the new state of
knowledge and trying to keep as close as possible to the previous game. Eventually, we will reach a state
large enough to enable our realizer to give always correct answers and we will win. Let us consider first
an example and then the formal definition of the winning strategy for Eloise.
Example (EM1). Given a predicate P of T, and its boolean negation predicate ¬P (which is repre-
sentable in T), the realizer EP of
EM1 := ∀x. ∃y P(x,y)∨∀y¬P(x,y)
is defined as
λαN〈XPα , 〈ΦPα , /0〉, λmN AddPαm〉
According to the rules of the game 1Back(TEM1), Abelard is the first to move and, for some numeral n,
chooses the formula
∃y P(n,y)∨∀y¬P(n,y)
Now is the turn of Eloise and she plays the strategy given by the term
〈XPn, 〈ΦPα , /0〉, λmN AddPnm〉
Hence, she computes XPn[ /0] = χP /0n = False (by definition 4), so she plays the formula
∀y¬P(n,y)
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and Abelard chooses m and plays
¬P(n,m)
If ¬P(n,m) = True, Eloise wins. Otherwise, she plays the strategy given by
(λmN AddPαm)m[ /0] = addP /0nm = {〈P,n,m〉}
So, the new knowledge state is now {〈P,n,m〉} and she backtracks to the formula
∃y P(n,y)∨∀y¬P(n,y)
Now, by definition 4, XPn[{〈P,n,m〉}] = True and she plays the formula
∃y P(n,y)
calculates the term
pi0〈ΦPn, /0〉[{〈P,n,m〉}] = ϕP{〈P,n,m〉}n = m
plays P(n,m) and wins.
Notation. In the following, we shall denote with upper case letters A,B,C closed arithmetical formulas,
with lower case letters p,q,r plays of TA and with upper case letters P,Q,R plays of 1Back(TA) (and all
those letters may be indexed by numbers). To avoid confusion with the plays of TA, plays of 1Back(TA)
will be denoted as p1, . . . , pn rather than p1 :: . . . :: pn. Moreover, if P = q1, . . . ,qm, then P, p1, . . . , pn will
denote the sequence q1, . . . ,qm, p1, . . . pn.
Definition 13 Fix u such that u A. Let p be a finite play of TA starting with A. We define by induction
on the length of p a term ρ(p) ∈ TClass (read as ‘the realizer adapt to p’) in the following way:
1. If p = A, then ρ(p) = u.
2. If p = (q :: ∃xB(x) :: B(n)) and ρ(q :: ∃xB(x)) = t, then ρ(p) = pi1t.
3. If p = (q :: ∀xB(x) :: B(n)) and ρ(q :: ∀xB(x)) = t, then ρ(p) = tn.
4. If p = (q :: B0∧B1 :: Bi) and ρ(q :: B0∧B1) = t, then ρ(p) = piit.
5. If p = (q :: B1∨B2 :: Bi) and ρ(q :: B1∨B2) = t, then ρ(p) = pit.
Given a play P = Q,q :: B of 1Back(TA), we set ρ(P) = ρ(q :: B).
Definition 14 Fix u such that u  A. Let ρ be as in definition 13 and P be a finite play of 1Back(TA)
starting with A. We define by induction on the length of P a state Σ(P) (read as ‘the state associated to
P’) in the following way:
1. If P = A, then Σ(P) =∅.
2. If P = (Q, p :: B, p :: B :: C) and Σ(Q, p :: B) = s, then Σ(P) = s.
3. If P = (Q, p :: B :: q, p :: B) and Σ(Q, p :: B :: q) = s and ρ(Q, p :: B :: q) = t, then if t : S, then
Σ(P) = s⋒ t[s], else Σ(P) = s.
Definition 15 (Winning strategy for 1Back(TA)) Fix u such that u A. Let ρ and Σ be respectively as
in definition 13 and 14. We define a function ω from the set of finite plays of 1Back(TA) to set of finite
plays of TA; ω is intended to be a recursive winning strategy from A for player one in 1Back(TA).
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1. If ρ(P,q :: ∃xB(x)) = t, Σ(P,q :: ∃xB(x)) = s and (pi0t)[s] = n, then
ω(P,q :: ∃xB(x)) = q :: ∃xB(x) :: B(n)
2. If ρ(P,q :: B∨C) = t and Σ(P,q :: B∨C) = s, then if (p0t)[s] = True then
ω(P,q :: B∨C) = q :: B∨C :: B
else
ω(P,q :: B∨C) = q :: B∨C :: C
3. If An is atomic, An = False, ρ(P,A1 :: · · · :: An) = t and Σ(P,A1 :: · · · :: An) = s, then
ω(P,A1 :: · · · :: An) = A1 :: · · · :: Ai
where i is equal to the smallest j < n such that ρ(A1 :: · · · :: A j) = w and either
A j = ∃xC(x)∧A j+1 =C(n)∧ (pi0w)[s⋒ t[s]] 6= n
or
A j = B1∨B2∧A j+1 = B1∧ (p0w)[s⋒ t[s]] = False
or
A j = B1∨B2∧A j+1 = B2∧ (p0w)[s⋒ t[s]] = True
If such j does not exist, we set i = n.
4. In the other cases, ω(P,q) = q.
Lemma 1 Suppose u A and ρ ,Σ,ω as in definition 15. Let Q be a finite ω-correct play of 1Back(TA)
starting with A, ρ(Q) = t, Σ(Q) = s. If Q = Q′,q′ :: B, then t s B.
Proof. By a straightforward induction on the length of Q.
Theorem 4 (Soundness Theorem) Let A be a closed negation and implication free arithmetical for-
mula. Suppose that u A and consider the game 1Back(TA). Let ω be as in definition 15. Then ω is a
recursive winning strategy from A for player one.
Proof. The theorem will be proved in the full version of this paper. The idea is to prove it by contradiction,
assuming there is an infinite ω-correct play. Then one can produce an increasing sequence of states.
Using theorems 1 and 2, one can show that Eloise’s moves eventually stabilize and that the game results
in a winnning position for Eloise.
4 Examples
Minimum Principle for functions over natural numbers. The minimum principle states that every
function f over natural numbers has a minimum value, i.e. there exists an f (n) ∈ N such that for every
m ∈ N f (m) ≥ f (n). We can prove this principle in HA+ EM1, for any f in the language. We assume
P(y,x) ≡ f (x) < y, but, in order to enhance readability, we will write f (x) < y rather than the obscure
P(y,x). We define:
Lesse f (n) := ∃α f (α)≤ n
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Less f (n) := ∃α f (α)< n
Notless f (n) := ∀α f (α)≥ n
Then we formulate - in equivalent form - the minimum principle as:
Hasmin f := ∃y. Notless f (y)∧Lesse f (y)
The informal argument goes as follows. As base case of the induction, we just observe that f (k) ≤ 0,
implies f has a minimum value (i.e. f (k)). Afterwards, if Notless f ( f (0)), we are done, we have find
the minimum. Otherwise, Less f ( f (0)), and hence f (α) < f (0) for some α given by the oracle. Hence
f (α)≤ f (0)−1 and we conclude that f has a minimum value by induction hypothesis.
Now we give the formal proofs, which are natural deduction trees, decorated with terms of TClass, as
formalized in [1]. We first prove that ∀n. (Lesse f (n)→Hasmin f )→ (Lesse f (S(n))→Hasmin f ) holds.
EP : ∀n. Notless f (S(n))∨Less f (S(n))
EPn : Notless f (S(n))∨Less f (S(n))
[Notless f (S(n))]
D1
Hasmin f
[Less f (S(n))]
D2
Hasmin f
D : Hasmin f
λ w2D : Lesse f (S(n))→ Hasmin f
λ w1λ w2D : (Lesse f (n)→ Hasmin f )→ (Lesse f (S(n))→ Hasmin f )
λ nλ w1λ w2D : ∀n(Lesse f (n)→ Hasmin f )→ (Lesse f (S(n)→ Hasmin f )
where the term D is looked at later, D1 is the proof
v1 : Notless f (S(n)) w2 : Lesse f (S(n))
〈v1,w2〉 : Notless f (S(n))∧Lesse f (S(n))
〈S(n),〈v1,w2〉〉 : Hasmin f
and D2 is the proof
v2 : [Less f (S(n))]
w1 : [Lesse f (n)→ Hasmin f ]
[x2 : f (z) < S(n)]
x2 : f (z)≤ n
〈z,x2〉 : Lesse f (n)
w1〈z,x2〉 : Hasmin f
w1〈pi0v2,pi1v2〉 : Hasmin f
We prove now that Lesse f (0)→ Hasmin f
w : [Lesse f (0)]
x1 : [ f (z) ≤ 0]
x1 : f (z) = 0
x1 : f (α) ≥ f (z)
λ αx1 : Notless f ( f (z))
/0 : f (z) ≤ f (z)
〈z, /0〉 : Lesse f ( f (z))
〈λ αx1,〈z, /0〉〉 : Notless f ( f (z))∧Lesse f ( f (z))
〈 f (z),〈λ αx1,〈z, /0〉〉〉 : Hasmin f
〈 f (pi0w),〈λ αpi1w,〈pi0w, /0〉〉〉 : Hasmin f
F := λ w〈 f (pi0w),〈λ αpi1w,〈pi0w, /0〉〉〉 : Lesse f (0)→ Hasmin f
Therefore we can conclude with the induction rule that
λαN RF(λnλw1λw2D)α : ∀x.Lesse f (x)→ Hasmin f
And now the thesis:
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/0 : f (0)≤ f (0)
〈0, /0〉 : Lesse f ( f (0))
λ αN RF(λ nλ w1λ w2D)α : ∀x.Lesse f (x)→ Hasmin f
RF(λ nλ w1λ w2D) f (0) : Lesse f ( f (0))→ Hasmin f
M := RF(λ nλ w1λ w2D) f (0)〈0, /0〉 : Hasmin f
Let us now take a closer look to D. We have defined
D := if XPS(n) then w1〈ΦPS(n), /0〉 else 〈S(n),〈λβ (AddP)S(n)β ,w2〉〉
Let s be a state and let us consider M, the realizer of Hasmin f , in the base case of the recursion and after
in its general form during the computation: RF(λnλw1λw2D) f (0)〈m, /0〉[s]. If f (0) = 0,
M[s] = RF(λnλw1λw2D) f (0)〈0, /0〉[s] =
= F〈0, /0〉 = 〈 f (0),〈λα /0,〈0, /0〉〉
If f (0) = S(n), we have two other cases. If χPsS(n) = True, then
RF(λnλw1λw2D)S(n)〈m, /0〉[s] =
= (λnλw1λw2D)n(RF(λnλw1λw2D)n)〈m, /0〉[s] =
= RF(λnλw1λw2D)n〈ΦP(S(n)), /0〉[s]
If χPsS(n) = False, then
RF(λnλw1λw2D)S(n)〈m, /0〉[s] =
= (λnλw1λw2D)n(RF(λnλw1λw2D)n)〈m, /0〉[s] =
= 〈S(n),〈λβ (addP)sS(n)β ,〈m, /0〉〉〉
In the first case, the minum value of f has been found. In the second case, the operator R, starting from
S(n), recursively calls itself on n; in the third case, it reduces to its normal form. From these equations, we
easily deduce the behavior of the realizer of Hasmin f . In a pseudo imperative programming language,
for the witness of Hasmin f we would write:
n := f (0);
while (χPsn = True, i.e. ∃m such that f (m)< n ∈ s)
do n := n−1;
return n;
Hence, when f (0)> 0, we have, for some numeral k
M[s] = 〈k,〈λβ (addP)skβ ,〈ϕPsk, /0〉〉〉
It is clear that k is the minimum value of f , according to the partial information provided by s about f ,
and that f (ϕPsk)≤ k. If s is sufficiently complete, then k is the true minimum of f .
The normal form of the realizer M of Hasmin f is so simple that we can immediately extract the winning
strategy ω for the 1-Backtraking version of the Tarski game for Hasmin f . Suppose the current state of
the game is s. If f (0) = 0, Eloise chooses the formula
Notless f (0)∧Lesse f (0)
and wins. If f (0) > 0, she chooses
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Notless f (k)∧Lesse f (k) = ∀α f (α)≥ k∧∃α f (α)≤ k
If Abelard chooses ∃α f (α) ≤ k, she wins, because she responds with f (ϕPsk)≤ k, which holds. Sup-
pose hence Abelard chooses
∀α f (α)≥ k
and then f (β )≥ k. If it holds, Eloise wins. Otherwise, she adds to the current state s
(λβ (addP)skβ )β = (addP)skβ = { f (β ) < k}
and backtracks to Hasmin f and then plays again. This time, she chooses
Notless f ( f (β ))∧Lesse f ( f (β ))
(using f (β ), which was Abelard’s counterexample to the minimality of k and is smaller than her previous
choice for the minimum value). After at most f (0) backtrackings, she wins.
Coquand’s Example. We investigate now an example - due to Coquand - in our framework of
realizability. We want to prove that for every function over natural numbers and for every a ∈ N there
exists x ∈ N such that f (x) ≤ f (x + a). Thanks to the minimum principle, we can give a very easy
classical proof:
Hasmin f
[Notless f (µ)∧Lesse f (µ)]
Lesse f (µ)
[Notless f (µ)∧Lesse f (µ)]
Notless f (µ)
f (z+a)≥ µ [ f (z)≤ µ ]
f (z)≤ f (z+a)
∃x f (x) ≤ f (x+a)
∀a∃x f (x) ≤ f (x+a)
∀a∃x f (x) ≤ f (x+a)
∀a∃x f (x)≤ f (x+a)
The extracted realizer is
λa〈pi0pi1pi1M,pi0pi1M(pi0pi1pi1M+a)⋒pi1pi1pi1h〉
where M is the realizer of Hasmin f . m := pi0pi1pi1M[s] is a point the purported minimum value µ := pi0M
of f is attained at, accordingly to the information in the state s (i.e. f (m)≤ µ). So, if Abelard chooses
∃x f (x) ≤ f (x+a)
Eloise chooses
f (m)≤ f (m+a)
We have to consider the term
U [s] := pi0pi1M(pi0pi1pi1M+a)⋒pi1pi1pi1M[s]
which updates the current state s. Surely, pi1pi1pi1M[s] = /0. pi0pi1M[s] is equal either to λβ (addP)sµβ or
to λα /0. So, what does U [s] actually do? We have:
U [s] = pi0pi1M(pi0pi1pi1M+a)[s] = pi0pi1M(m+a)[s]
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with either pi0pi1M(m+a)[s] = /0 or
pi0pi1M(m+a)[s] = { f (m+a)< f (m)}
So U [s] tests if f (m + a) < f (m); if it is not the case, Eloise wins, otherwise she enlarges the state
s, including the information f (m+ a) < f (m) and backtracks to ∃x f (x) ≤ f (x+ a). Starting from the
state /0, after k+ 1 backtrackings, it will be reached a state s′, which will be of the form { f ((k+ 1)a <
f (ka), . . . , f (2a) < f (a), f (a) < f (0)} and Eloise will play f ((k+ 1)a) ≤ f ((k+ 1)a+ a). Hence, the
extracted algorithm for Eloise’s witness is the following:
n := 0; while f (n) > f (n+a) do n := n+a; return n;
5 Partial Recursive Learning Based Realizability and Completeness
In this section we extend our notion of realizability and increase the computational power of our realizers,
in order to be able to represent any partial recursive function and in particular, we conjecture, every
recursive strategies of 1-Backtracking Tarski games. So, we choose to add to our calculus a fixed point
combinator Y, such that for every term u : A → A, Yu = u(Yu).
Definition 16 (Systems PCFClass and PCFLearn ) We define PCFClass and PCFLearn to be, respectively, the
extensions of TClass and TLearn obtained by adding for every type A a constant YA of type (A → A)→ A
and a new equality axiom YAu = u(YAu) for every term u : A → A.
Since in PCFClass there is a schema for unbounded iteration, properties like convergence do not hold
anymore (think about a term taking a states s and returning the largest n such that χPsn = True ). So
we have to ask our realizers to be convergent. Hence, for each type A of PCFClass we define a set ‖A‖ of
terms u : A which we call the set of stable terms of type A. We define stable terms by lifting the notion
of convergence from atomic types (having a special case for the atomic type S, as we said) to arrow and
product types.
Definition 17 (Convergence) Assume that {si}i∈N is a w.i. sequence of state constants, and u,v ∈
PCFClass.
1. u converges in {si}i∈N if there exists a normal form v such that ∃i∀ j ≥ i.u[s j] = v in PCFLearn.
2. u converges if u converges in every w.i. sequence of state constants.
Definition 18 (Stable Terms) Let {si}i∈N be a w.i. chain of states and s ∈ S. Assume A is a type. We
define a set ‖A‖ of terms t ∈ PCFClass of type A, by induction on A.
1. ‖S‖= {t : S | t converges}
2. ‖N‖= {t : N | t converges}
3. ‖Bool‖= {t : Bool | t converges}
4. ‖A×B‖= {t : A×B | pi0t ∈ ‖A‖,pi1t ∈ ‖B‖}
5. ‖A → B‖= {t : A → B | ∀u ∈ ‖A‖, tu ∈ ‖B‖}
If t ∈ ‖A‖, we say that t is a stable term of type A.
Now we extend the notion of realizability with respect to PCFClass and PCFLearn.
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Definition 19 (Realizability) Assume s is a state constant, t ∈ PCFClass is a closed term of state /0, A∈L
is a closed formula, and t ∈ ‖|A|‖. Let~t = t1, . . . , tn : N.
1. t s P(~t) if and only if t[s] = /0 in PCFLearn implies P(~t) = True
2. t s A∧B if and only if pi0t s A and pi1t s B
3. ts A∨B if and only if either p0t[s] = True in PCFLearn and p1ts A, or p0t[s] = False in PCFLearn
and p2t s B
4. t s A → B if and only if for all u, if us A, then tus B
5. t s ∀xA if and only if for all numerals n, tns A[n/x]
6. t s ∃xA if and only for some numeral n, pi0t[s] = n in PCFLearn and pi1t s A[n/x]
We define t  A if and only if t s A for all state constants s.
The following conjecture will be addressed in the next version of this paper:
Theorem 5 (Conjecture) Suppose there exists a recursive winning strategy for player one in 1Back(TA).
Then there exists a term t of PCFClass such that t  A.
6 Conclusions and Further work
The main contribution of this paper is conceptual, rather than technical, and it should be useful to under-
stand the significance and see possible uses of learning based realizability. We have shown how learning
based realizers may be understood in terms of backtracking games and that this interpretation offers a
way of eliciting constructive information from them. The idea is that playing games represents a way of
challenging realizers; they react to the challenge by learning from failure and counterexamples. In the
context of games, it is also possible to appreciate the notion of convergence, i.e. the fact that realizers
stabilize their behaviour as they increase their knowledge. Indeed, it looks like similar ideas are useful
to understand other classical realizabilities (see for example, Miquel [9]).
A further step will be taken in the full version of this paper, where we plan to solve the conjecture
about the completeness of learning based realizability with respect to 1Backtracking games. As pointed
out by a referee, the conjecture could be interesting with respect to a problem of game semantics, i.e.
whether all recursive innocent strategies are intepretation of a term of PCF.
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